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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS LAYTON MASTBAUM * No. 1977^ 
and KATHLEEN MARIE MASTBAUM, 
Defendants and 
Appellants, * 
Thomas Lavton Mastbaum and Kathleen Marie Mastbaum, 
Appellants, bv and through their counsel of record, resoectfullv 
submit the follovinq rpolv in response to the brief heretofore 
filed by the Rpsnon^ent in this action reoardino the Familv 
Exclusion Provision of the Resoondent/Plaintiff!s insurance 
police issued to th^ Defendant Thomas Lavton Mastbaum and also 
in regards to the Doctrine of Intersoousal Tort Immunitv. 
* 
APPELLANTS1 REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY IS VIOLATIVE OF 
PUBLIC POLICY OF THE CTATE OF UTAH AS ASSERTED IN APPELLANTS' 
BRlKb;. 
Defendant respectfully submits that under Utah's Married 
Women's Act U.C.A. §30-2-4 (1953 as amended), and as interpreted 
in Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590, 591f the Doctrine of 
Interspousal Immunity is violative of Dublic policy and as such 
is fullv abrogated. Plaintiff fails to interpret the Stoker 
case properly. Thev contend that under Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 
14 Utah 2d 344f 384 P.2d 38Q (1963), the Interspousal Immunity 
Doctrine is still aoplicable to nonintentional tort cases between 
spouses. For the reasons outlined in ApDellants' Brief, this is 
an erroneous assumption. Stoker overruled Rubalcava. 
Further evidence and support for Appellants1 view of Stoker 
can be found in two recent cases dealino with the Interspousal 
Immunitv Rule. In a Maryland case, Roblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 
242, 4^2 AR.2d ^0* (108^), the Court held that the Interspousal 
Immunitv Rule is no lonqer viable in cases soundinq in neoliqence. 
In suonort for their holdino, the Court does a study of their 
sister states. In their stu^vf they found that all of the other 
49 states have addressed the issue with the followinq results: 
1. Twelve states continue to recognize the doctrine. 
2. Thirtv-five states have abrogated the doctrine fully 
or partially. 
3. In two states, a rule of immunity is imposed by 
statute, 
(id. at 511) 
In Appendix A of this studyf id. at 524, Utah was listed as 
having fully abrogated the interspousal immunity rule as a result 
of the Stoker case. This is further proof that Defendant's 
interpretation of the Stoker case is correct and recognized by 
other states as well. 
The other decision, Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 
1983) , also held that the interspousal tort immunity rule was 
totally abolished in Tennessee. This decision not only is rele-
vant in its holding and reasoning by pointing out that the 
majority trend is turning away from the doctrine and that our 
judicial system is competent enough to recognize frivolous and 
fraudulent claims, but the decision also stands for the proposi-
tion that there should be no distinction drawn between intentional 
and negligent torts. 
Plaintiff/Respondent's Brief places much emphasis of the 
distinction between negligent and intentional torts. As asserted 
in our brief, no distinction was made in the Stoker case when 
thev abrogated the interspousal immunity rule. As stated in 
Davis, id at 758, the following language expresses our view: 
"The instant case. . . involves a negligent tort 
rather than an intentional one. We are of the 
opinion that insofar as interspousal liability 
for tort is concerned, there is no logical or 
leqal reason for drawing a dinstinction between 
the two. . ." Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal.2d 692, 693 
26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 103, 376 P.2d 70, 71 (1961). 
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In sumf the legal abstraction of unity is no longer available 
to support retention of interspousal immunity. The public policy 
reasons asserted by the Plaintiff/Respondent's Brief of preserving 
family harmony ?r.d the prevention of spurious insurance claims do 
not justify the application of the interspousal immunity doctrine. 
Moreover, we are not convinced that family harmony can be pre-
served and fraud prevented by continued application of the 
doctrine. For these reasons and those outlined in our brief, we 
submit that interspousal tort immunity is totally abolished in 
Utah. 
POINT II 
THE FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSE CONTAINED IN PLAINTIFF1S 
INSURANCE POLICY IS VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE AS IT IS VIOLATIVE 
OF PUBLIC POLICY UNDER UTAH LAW. 
As explained in Appellants1 Brief, the family exclusion 
provision violates the public policy of the State of Utah and 
is violative of the public policy behind the Utah Safety 
Responsibilitv Act, 30-2-4 U.C.A., 1953 as amended, and Article If 
Section II of the Utah Constitution. 
The Plaintiff/Respondent makes the erroneous dinstinction 
between negliqent and intentional torts and cites the dissent 
in Stoker v. Stoker, supra, to support their argument that the 
wife should not be allowed to sue her husband based on a tort 
claim. Again, we assert that the dissent reasoning is fine if one 
is searching an understanding on the law before Stoker, but if an 
understanding of the present law and its effect is desired, the 
courts in this case should look to the actual law as decided in 
the majority opinion of Stoker. 
The Respondent's brief further states, "this opinion [the 
dissent in Stoker] has been supported by most states that adhere 
to the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. Most of these 
jurisdictions have followed the qeneral principle mentioned by 
Chief Justice Crockett that statutes are not deemed to repeal the 
common law unless the legislative intent to do so is clearly 
manifested." This statement though true is somewhat misleading. 
What they fail to mention is that these states that do adhere to 
the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity are in the vast 
minority. Of the 50 states, only 12 states continue to recognize 
the doctrine. See Boblitz v. Boblitz, supra. 
Plaintiff's claim that the family exclusion law neither 
violates legislative pronouncement nor judicial precedent. This 
argument is often posited when a long standing rule is attached. 
It is two pronged - first, it is asserted that stare decisis 
requires that prior decisions be honored; second, it is said that 
a court acts extrajudiciallv when it vitiates a time-honored rule 
of law and exceeds the scope of its intended governmental 
function. 
To the first argument, we can onlv replv that our commitment 
to stare decisis remains strong. However, mindless obedience to 
precedent can confound the search for truth and foster an attitude 
of contempt. See Davis v. Davis, supra. 
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The second prong of the argument is particularly inappro-
priate in our particular case. The Plaintiff/Appellee contends 
that the household exclusion clause should be allowed to afford 
protection to the insurer from collusive suits of family members. 
As stated in Appellants' Brief/ this "is wholly unpersuasive 
because the exclusion far exceeds the evil which it is designed 
to protect against; collusion and fraud are the exception rather 
than the rule." [Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomby 622 P.2d 
1234 (Wash. 1980)] The family exclusion clause effectively closes 
the door to all types of cases in that class justified solely 
because there may be a greater opportunity for fraud or collusion 
[Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1972)]. Defendant again 
contends that this is whv the collusion argument submitted by 
Plaintiff is unpersuasive. Defendant contends that this Court 
should follow the Wiscombe rationale and follow the modern trend 
of public policy that Utah has shifted towards allowing intra-
family torts to be actionable at law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellants respectfully reauest this Court to reverse the 
Trial Court and hold that Interspousal Tort Immunitv is abrogated 
in Utah and that the familv exclusion provisions of Plaintiff's 
Insurance policy is violative of public oolicv in Utah and that 
the case be remanded for further appropriate proceedings. 
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Respectfully submitted this ' day of June, 1984. 
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